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PREFACE 
'll'1hie problem of economic instability and its solution is always, 
it seems to me 9 a pertinent one for investigation by economists. 
Certainly» the s~bject lws and does hold a prominent place in eeono-
mic li terat\lllre 9 and many writers feel that a partial solution--the 
wise app lication cf monetary and fiscal pGlicy--has been developed. 
Om the other hand, a leading economist haa recently expressed his belief 
that the ~merican ec~nG111y 11 inherently mQre stable now than it wa1 
twenty year, ago. B~t the problem remain1 • 
. 
ln ev~limating the stabi~ity of our economy 9 mo•t writers include 
a referellllee to t1H e:d.1tnl!!e cf certain ''built-in" 1tabilizers. Theae 
are in1tU:llllti~11l arrang•enu which» &ltho11£gh aerving other purpoae1, 
are said to more er le11 i~cidentally inaert a 1tabilizing influence 
illllto t he system. The Ullllemplo,-ent insurance system is usually included 
program in all its aspects with the specific purpose of empirically 
t~ do a~ . I was g~ided in this endeavor by Drs. J. J. Klos and A. M. 
Sharp 9 and wi~h to thank them for their patient assistance. My wife, 
Edys 9 who perf~rm~d the typi~g chore, deserves special recognition. The 
f£ct that 01lllr m.1.r~i~ge S\1Jlrvived the ordeal testifies, not to my excel -
iU 
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CHAPTER I 
INTB.ODUCTICll 
Modern economics textbooks invariably refer to the United States 
unemployment insurance system as a ''built-in stabilizer." The validity 
of these asserti01ms co~stitutes the subject of this study. It is 
. 
proposed to test. the proposition that unemployment compensation acts 
as an automatic device exerting a stabilizing influence in our nation's 
economy. Before elaborating on thi.s objective, a few camnents concern-
ing the concept of automaticity will be helpful. 
The Concept of Autamaticity 
Economic forces can be divided, for analytical purposes, into two 
broad categories. First, there are forces which are automatic in nature. 
They operate or are supposed to operate in a consistent and logical 
fashion so that their direction and intensity can be predicted, or at 
least described. S\\llch fC!>lt'ces are not subject to rapid change since they 
arise out of human natll!re, human institutions, laws, and customs. 
''NormalL" or ''nat\\lliral" automaticity can be distinguished from ''built-
in" automaticity. The fonaer type is based more directly on human nature 
and the institutions which evolve to give expression to human needs. The 
econiomic theories of cons111mption, production, income distribution, and 
the theory of economic equilibrium are based on the existence of such 
c<l>llllsistent and predictable human behavior patterns. An important ch :t· -
2 
characteristic of this type af economic force is that it is generated 
by individuals independently pursuing their own particular needs and 
interests. The market place is usually ~~ought of as giving expression, 
direction, and organiz•tion to these automatic forces. 
'~uilt-in automaticity results more directly frGm cooperative 
effort. Society 1cmetime1 finds that existing economic institutions 
d not produce certain desired results ad consciously set about to 
create new ones. After initial action of this sert, how&ver, the 
economic forces finding expression in the consciously cr~ated insti-
tution operate as automatically as those finding expression in the 
market place or similar devices. The unemployment insurance system is 
an example of this type of automaticity. It was found that the infor-
mal market did not .always provide job~ and i~come for the worker. 
Society felt that something should be done and created a new institution 
to fulfill its objectiiil-,r.. 
The second broad category of economic forces can be referred to as 
non-automatic. Such a fGrce is not predictable, following no est~-
blished pattern. No particular known circumstance will necessari ly 
bring it into Gperation. '~cts of God " affecting economic phenomena 
are in this category . Of the forces res~!ting from human decisions, 
central government action, including sporadic and unpredictable fiscal 
policies, whether arisiimg from political or economic considerations, is 
an examp le . These forces can be thought of as ext e~bal to the economic 
system, n~t constituting part of its internal .s tructure, while automatic 
forces are part of the fy&tem and operate through its es t ablished 
institutiGns. 
Automaticity as a Sou,:ce of Dis•greement 
Among economists, the automaticity of an economic system has been, 
in the past, a controversial subject. They have all, however, wished 
to determine whether or not a capitalistic economic system possesses 
forces which automatically (without conscious human effort being 
directed toward this purpose) produce levels of production high enough 
to insure full employment of all resources, and especially the human 
resource. Opposite answers given this question provided the basic 
difference between "Keynesian" and "Classical" economists for several 
years subsequent to publication of the General Theory. 
Don Patinkin has summarized these conflicting viewpoints. He 
states, ''The traditional interpretation of Keynesian economics is that 
it demonstrates the absence of an automatic mechanism assuring the 
l 
equality of desired savings and investment at full employment." 
Patinkin proceeds to point out that Keynesians were accused of failing 
to recognize that the rate of interest affects savings and investment 
as well as income. The accusers felt that " ••• variations in the 
interest rate serve as an automatic mechanism insuring full employ-
ment.,r2 The answer to this argument was, in Patinkin's words, "that it 
greatly exaggerates the importance of the rate of interest • •• Whether 
the system will generate full employment depends on whether the full 
employment savings and investment functions intersect at a positive 
rate of interest. But there is no automatic mechanism to insure that 
l Don Patinkin, ·~rice Flexibility and Full Employment, " Readings 
.!!t,Monetary ;rheory (New York, 1951), p. 253. 
2 Ibid., P• 254. 
3 
the savings Jnd investment function~ will have the proper slope and 
position to bring about such an int~rsection.•~ Patinkin concludes, 
4 
''The fundamental disagreement between Keynesian and Classical economics 
lies in the former's denial of the automaticity of full employment 
posited by the latter.'~ 
The argument centered around the savings-investment function. The 
question posed was: Will desired savings equal desired investment at 
full employment levels of output? If this ques~ion deserves a negative 
answer, at least one of two conditions will e~ist. Either people wish 
to save too much or they wish to invest too little. Both of these 
conditions can be described by a generalization that the aJgregate 
--: ~,. :~ f, 
demand far goods and services will be insufficient to absotb a full 
employment level of production. Thus, the problem has often been for-
~vlated in terms of the ability (or inability) of the system to auto-
mat"tcally generate aggregate demand of sufficient force. The automati-
city' around which the controversy centered was of the "norqaal" type 
I 
described above. The question was whether or not individuals acting 
ind~pendently of one another would generate forces resulting in a full 
employment economy. 
Samuelson and Burns on the Autotnaticity of the Aa•rican Economy 
Out of Keynesian and Classi~. ,eonomics arose two distinc't and 
seemingly incompatible bodies of thought, microeconomics and macro-
.eco~ic~. it..A..~he passage of time, however, the disputants began to 
seek ~lbacm; ,foOitd1.,~fliflunderstandi~g ~and ,aphievements. As Paul 
3 Ibid .• , pp ... 256, 25 7. 4 Ibid., P• 257. 
Samuelson says, "In recent years, ninety per cent of American econo-
mists have stopped being 'Keynesian economists' or 'anti-Keynesian 
economists. ' Instead they have worked toward a synthesis of whatever 
is valuable in older economics and in modern theories of income dis-
tribution. The results might be called 'neo-classical economics' and 
is accepted in its broad outlines by all but about 5 per cent of 
extreme left-wing and right-wing writers.'~ 
Samuelson goes on to aver that this peaceful coexistence among 
economists has resulted in a ''grand neoclassical synthesis" which he 
refers to as ''an important tenet of modern economics." He describes 
this tenet in the following manner: 
5 
By means of appropriately reinforcing monetary and fiscal policies, our 
mixed enterprise system can avoid the excesses of boom and slump and 
can look forward to a healthy progressive growth. This fundamental 
being under•tcod, the paradoxes that robbed the older classical prin• 
ciples dealing with small scale ''m.icroeconomics" of much of their 
relevance and validity-·these paradoxes will now lose their sting. 
bl short, mastery of modern analysis of ~ncome determination genuinely 
validates the basic classical pricing principles; and--perhaps for the 
first time·-the economist is justified in saying that the broad cleavage 
between microeconomics and macroeconomics has been closed.6 
What are the implications of this synthesis in regard to the Keynes-
ian-Classical dispute? Samuelson seems to be saying that the Ame~~can 
I 
economic system would, if left alone, probably not a~tomatically prQduce 
stability and full employment, but it really doesn't matter anyway. 
Monetary and fiscal tools are available so that we can make the system 
operate the way we wish. Certainly one way of eliminating a disagree-
ment is to brand the issue in question as too insignificant to merit 
5 Paul A. Samuelsou, Economics, ~ ,Introductory ,Analysis (5th ed., 
New York 9 195S) » PP• 209., 210. 
6 Ibid., P• 360. 
c-onsideration. But othets have recently approached the problem of 
automaticity in a somewhat different manner •. 
A. F. Burns delivered an interesting address at the 1959 American 
Economic Association Convention. Being impressed by the stability 
which our economy has exhibited in recent years, he observed: 
Although our economy continues to be swayed by the business cycle, its 
impact on the lives and fortunes of individuals has been substantially 
reduced in our generation. More than twenty-five years have elapsed 
since we last experienced a financial panic or a deep depression of 
production and employment. Over twenty years ~ave elapsed since we 
last had a severe business recession. Between the end of the Second 
World War and the presentp we have experienced four recessions, but 
each was a relatively minor setback. Since 1937 we have had five 
recessions, the longest of which lasted only 13 months. There is no 
parallel for such a sequence of mild--or such a sequence of brief-- 7 
contractionsp at least during the past hundred years in our country. 
6 
In short, the American economy has since 1940 operated at near full 
employment levels, and this is a novelty. What is the explanation? Has 
stability been achieved because the policy formulations arising out of 
Samuelson's '~grand synthesis" have been employed? Burns attaches some 
importance to this, but offers other explanations. 
"In our generation 9 " Burns says, "the structure of the American econ-
omy has changed profoundly, partly as a result of deliberate economic 
8 policies, partly as a result of unplanned developments." The growth 
of corporations with xheir stable dividend policies, the progressive 
income tax, transfer payment programs by governmental bodies, and other 
structural changes have, according to Burns, stabilized the flow of 
income by partially separating the flow of income from the flow of pro-
duction. A stable income flow helps, of course, to stabilize 
7 Arthur F. Burns 9 ''Progress Toward Economic Stability,''. The Ag,er-
ican Economic Review, March, 1960, PP• 1,2. 
8 Ibid., P• 2. 
consumption at high levels. And this goes a long way toward the main-
tenance of an aggregate demand sufficient to absorb full employment 
levels of production. 
ln connection with the discussion of automaticity, Burns seems to 
be taying: Up until recently, automatic forces could not be relied 
upon to produce a stable and full-employment level of economic acti-
vity, but the struc~ural changes which have taken place have produced 
an economic system which approaches this performance. The existence 
and influence of non-automatic forces are recognized by Burns. "To be 
sure," he says, "special factors of an episodic character played their 
9 part in recent business cycles, as they always have." After enumera-
ting some of these factors, however, he c~ncludes, ''The ability of our 
economy to adjust to such major disturbances without experiencing a 
series of protracted slumps testifies not onlf to our good luck, it 
testifies to the stabilizing power of the structural changes that I 
10 have emphasized." 
Burns therefore feels that stability and prosperity have been 
ac~ieved, not primarily because of monetary and fiscal policy appli-
cations, but primarily because the inner workings of the system have 
produced such results. It sho~ld not be inferred that the conclusions 
7 
reached by Burns and Samuelson are necessarily incompatible. Neverthe-
less, Samuelson places emphasis on the availability of outside help 
(monetary and fiscal policy), when and if automatic forces fail, while 
Burns seems to have more faith in the unassisted performance of the 
recently modified American economy. 
9 Ibid., P• 16. 10 Ibid., P• 60. 
8 
Both writers, furthermore, are optimistic concerning the future 
performance of our economy. Samuelson is cautious: 
The worst of the business cycle, whic,h ••• plagued capitalism from 
its beginning, is probably a thing of the past. But that does not 
mean that the cycle is gone: we still shall have minor inventory 
fluctuations, still shall have transitions from war to peace and from 
one kind of a boom to another. The difference ~ill be this: the age-
old tendencies for the system to fluctuate will still be there, but no 
longer will the world let them snowball into vast depressions or into 
galloping in~lations••no longer will we let our banking system fail 
and our nation go through the most painful deb.t inflation and .bank• 
ruptcy.11 
Most of his confidence rests on the wise application of monetary and 
fiscal policy. 
Burns is somewhat bolder.·, "It seems reasonable," he states, "tei> 
expect that the structural changes in our economy, which have recently 
served to moderate and humanize the business cycle, will continue to do 
so," and concludes, ''The business cycle is unlikely to be as disturbing 
12 
or troublesome to our chUdren as it once was to us or our fathers." 
His confidence does not lie in the availability of · corrective tools of 
policy, but in the system itself. 
The Significance of Built-in Stability 
Part of the optimism shared by both writers originates in their 
observations that certain automatic forces favorable to stability have 
been ''built in" to our economy. Burns merely views these developments 
as part of the structural changes which have occurred. An important 
distinction, however, can be made between a stable dividend policy by 
a corporation, and the unemployment insurance system, although the 
11 Samuelson» PP• 340, 341. 
12 Burns, PP• 16, 17. 
9 
elfects on economic stability may be similar. The former development 
results from private individuals acting independently of one another, 
whereas the latter is the result of social action. A stable dividend 
policy is not ''built in" to our system; it evolved out of the needs 
of private interests. 
Samuelson is rather enthusiastic concerning ''built-in" automati· 
city. He says: 
The modern fiscal system has great inherent automatic stabilizing prop-
erties. All through the day and night, whether the President is in the 
White House or golfing on some distant vacation links, the fiscal 
system is helping to keep our economy stable. If in 1961 a recession 
should get under way while Congress is out of session, powerful auto-
matic forces would go instantly into action to counteract it without 
t he need for any committee meetings or for the exercise of any human 
intelligence.13 
Samuelson proceeds to enumerate these automatic stabilizers: automatic 
changes in tax recei pts, unemployment compensation and other welfare 
14 programs, farm aid prcgraas, and corporate -and family savings. 
Thus, part of the stability achieved in the recent past and pre-
dieted for the future is attributed to automatic forces which have been 
''built in'' to the economy. It is said that due to these and other 
automatic forces which have more or less evolved, and forces of a non~ 
automatic nature ( onetary and fiscal policy), the American economy 
will, with qualifications, tend to operate at fairly stable levels of 
production. The implication is, of course, that these levels will be 
not only stable, but will approach full employment. 
If these great automatic stabilizers are to be relied upon even 
15 
as, in Samuelson's words, "a first line of defense" against economic 
13 Samuelson, P• 345. 
14rbid., PP• 345, 346 . 15Ibid., P• 346. 
10 
instability 9 they warrant further investigation. Theoretically to 
attribute stabilizing properties to them is not enough; more empirical 
study is needed. It would be helpful to know the extent to which the 
nation's tax system, the unemployment compensation program, and other 
devices operate to counteract fluctuations in economic activity, if 
they do possess counter-cyclical properties. 
One study has shown, for instance, that our tax structure in its 
entirety is not as progressive as one would be led to conclude when 
viewing the federal income tax in isolation. In f~ct, state and local 
taxes were found to be, during 1948, regressive for all income levels. 
Furthermore, total taxes, federal, state, and local, were, in 1948, 
regressive for the lowest income levels and were practically propor-
tional from around $2500 to around $4500. For higher levels, total 
16 taxes were progressive. 
Regardless of the existence (or lack) of progressivity in a tax 
system, if tax receipts vary directly with income, a counter-cyclical 
effect is likely. A regressive tax, however, is not as counter-
cyclical as a progressive one. 
In connection with farm aid, price support programs are not neces-
sarily counter-cyclical. In good crop years, supports provide a rela-
tively high farm income, but when crops fail, price supports are ren-
dered ineffective. If a recessionary movement were to be precipitated 
by, or coincide with, widespread adverse weather conditions, our sup-
port policy would provide little anti-cyclical influence. 
16a. A. Musgrave and others, . ''Distribution of Tax Payments by 
Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948," National Tax Journal, 
March, 1951, p. 27. 
11 
This work is not meant to disagree with the general positions of 
either Burns or Samuelson. Our economy has exhibited a high degree of 
stability and prosperity of late. Monetary and fiscal policy is avail-
able. Structural changes have occurred, and the future may produce 
even more stability than in the past. A pessimist might, however, 
remember the Biblical admonition: ''When they cry peace and safety, 
17 then sudden destruction cometh upon them." The cautious economist 
merely calls for further investigation. 
Purpose and Scope of the Study 
As mentioned earlier, an inquiry into the counter-cyclical aspects 
of the United States unemployment compensation system is the intent of 
this study. More specifically, it is meant to test the proposition 
that unemployment insurance acts as a bui~t-in stabilizer in the Amer-
lean economy by automatically setting in motion forces which are expan-
sionary when aggregate economic activity is falling, and, conversely, 
by generating contractionary forces when activity is rising. 
There are several different programs under which unemployed persons 
receive financial assistance. The study is confined to the federal-
state program initiated by the Social Security Act of 1935. The pro-
grams providing compensation for railroad workers, placed under exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction in 1939, for veterans and for federal · employ-
ees, are excluded from consideration. 
The state-federal system is viewed in this work as an automatic 
device for augmenting and diminishing the nation's income stream. 
171IThess. 5:3. 
12 
The magnit11!de of the device is discussed in the following chapter. 
This involves an investigation of the provisions and operations of the 
Social Security Act and the state laws which give the system its legal 
existence. The nature ef the device is considered in Chapter III. 
Th.is entails a consideration of the economic impact which various 
aspects of the program are likely to produce. Chapter IV is reserved 
for an empirical study cencerning the timing of the automatic device. 
From available data~ a~ attempt is made to determine whether or not 
additions to income made by the program coincide with a falling income 
and vice versa. A swmu.ry and some conclusions are presented in 
Chapter v. 
· Cll.lPl'El 11 
. THE MAGNITITJ)E OF lfflEMPLODQUJT INSURANCE 
As the name implies, the primary purpos~ of an unemployment in• 
s"rance system is to providl fil\llncial·assistaac:e fo~ the unemployed. 
The United States syst• can \)t •ummar.tz•d briefly: Employers, subject 
to the Federal·Unemployment 'ffil.X 4ct and state unemployment compensation 
laws, are required to cntribute a stipulated percentage (from 0-2. 7, 
depending on the state and the employer's experience with unemployment} 
of their taxable payrolls (usually defin•d as th• summatien of the 
first $3000 of eaca . .eanpleyee's annual earnings) to state unemployment 
. ; ·,·,:,: . . i· 
. . I 
-trust funds. These funds are deposited with th.e Secretary of the 
rreasury o.f tlie United States and constitute a ~'lnaster" unemployment 
ttuat- fund out- of whtchi;.tat•e&··.,.···draw,, .. ~~ ••. w$-tli whita•,1-hinftJ;tffilP.n··· 
.. . ;-.. _!:·:· .. ·· :· ... 
1M11miti1'f~~-gmade to eligible unemployed persons~ Money not immediately 
needed is invested in government obligations~ 1 
A person's right to receive benefits depends upon tlae law. of the 
state in which be was employed •. In general; an unemployed person will 
be eligible to receive assistance if ._cir n• has·, while working in. 
' ' I ' ' • • • • • ' • • 
covered employment, eith.er earned a· stipula~ed. !minimum amow,.t or 
worked a stipulated minimum time period, or.· both; (2) be is presently 
1u. s., Burea• of Employment Secur·tt7, C0111part9on .!! Stat3'.,tmem~ 
plo;yment . Insurance .L!!!!- .!! .of January !~ · 1958, ·_· (thi~ted. States qvern.• 
meat Priat.ing Office, Waslain.gton, 1958), pp~ 17, 44, 47. · · · 
13 
a member of tae laber fGrce (that is, if ae is actively seeki'P.I work); 
(3) he ~s not disqualified fw other reasons (such as quitting former 
14 
job without good reason or r~fusing. to accept offered employment.) The 
weekly benefit amount and tlae time period during which benefits will . 
be received ordinarily depends on. the lea.th of toe worker's former 
employment, his earnings level while employed, and, in some states, 
2 the number of hi.s dependents. The average weekly benefit for the 
nation during 1958 was $30.5$, and the average number pf weeks durins 
f 3 which bene its were rec~ived by an unemployed person was 15 weeks. 
Uuemployment Insurance as an Automatic Device 
Before examining the program ia afore detail, a perspective is 
needed. Although the primary purpose of unempl~ent insurance, ~s 
stated earlier, is assistance to the unemployed, the program can be 
viewed in another way. As a built•in stabilizer, it is an automatic 
device for adding to. and. subtracting from the nation's iac·ome stream. 
The counter-cyclical quality of the device 1s determined by t.he u.ture, 
magnitude, an.cl timing ef the additions aad subtractions, and this is 
determined by the rules under whick tne program operates.. Henc.e., we 
proceed .to examine these rules; but fii::st II s0me general comments about 
the counter-cyclical determinants of the devie~. 
Additions to income made by the program consist of transfer·pay• 
meats to active spenders in the form of benefit payments to the 
2 Ibid., P• 49. 
3u. s., Social Security Administ.-atien, Social Security Bulletin, 
Annual StatistiCal .Supplement, 1958, j .. 12. · ,,. 
15 
unemployed, and, occurring in connection with trust fund operations, 
traimsf er· payments to inactive spenders and gevernment purchases ef 
goods aad services. Subtractions from the income stream take the form 
of transfer payments from active spenders through the payroll tax on 
employers, and, again in connection with trust. fund operations, trans-
fer payments from inactive spenders. 
The extent to ,rhich income is augmented by.tae device depends.on 
the volume of eligible unemployed and the size an.d duration of benefit 
payments .. Covered employment, the size of taxable payrolls, and the 
federal tax and state contribution rates determine the degree to which 
the program will diminish income. 
The timing of the device refers to the coincidence of injections 
with a falling income and the coincidence of subtractions with a ris-
ing income.. Assuming the program is, timed properly, and ignoring 
trust fund operations, the unemployment in,urance system will be more 
~ounter-cyclical the greater the following: 
(1) With respect to additions 
(a) the volume of covered. employment and eligible unemployment 
(b) th.e.,size aad duration of be~efit p~yments 
. (2) With respect to subtractions 
(a) the volume of. cevered employment 
(b) the size of taxablepa.yrc:tllsJof cov•red employers 
(c) the federal tax and state cantribution rates 
The nature Gf our autGmatie device will be discussed at some 
length in Chapter Ill. Chapter J.V will be concernef;l· with the timing 
aspect; therefore 9 any final concl.usion concernb.g the counter-c;yclical 
qualities of the program must await the presentation of empirical data 
16 
in that chapter. The p-resent chapter deals with the size of unemploy• 
ment insurance. It is pi'epose.d to point out the more important prcwi• 
sions in the laws and ellanges in these previsions wnieh reflect upen 
the subject under discussion. Since the. discussion is not meant to b.e · 
a complete_ description of the system, many; important aspec.ts will be 
omitted. 
C0verage_. 
One measurement of the size of unemployaent iasurance·is the po• 
. . 
tential number of assistance recipients-.> ienefit payments are liaited 
to unemployed persons wtao., waen working,. were cliissified as. covered 
employment. Employees are cevered if their employment makes their 
employers subject to the federal ex~ise tax and/or state unemployment 
compensation laws. The volume of c0V'er.ed eaployaent is. partly de.ter-
mined by the fecileral gever..-nt. B:esides -placing an excise tax on the 
payrolls of certain employers, . the Social Securit}' Act of 193.5 allows 
subject employers to escape meat c,f this tax if. t:lley are r,,rutr:ed by 
. . . 4 .· 
state laws to contribute to unemployme1tt trust:f•ds.· The_conal>ined 
impact of these previsions made it imperative that each state not c;,aly 
institute unemployment insurance systems~ but .that these systeias be .at 
. :~.: . 
·. •. 
least as inclusive as the federal excise _tax. Otherwise, a. st.itte loses. 
revenue to the Federal Treasury with nodireet Qenefit to its citiz.eas. 
Botn federal and state laws utilize a two-fold criter.ia to de_termiae 
coverage; . (1) the size of the firm in terms of. employees; (2) the 
·. . . 
type of firm in. terms of service performed by its employees. 
The size~of-firm provision of th, original federal act covered 
employers who had in their employ eight or more persons on any day 
I 
during twenty different weeks in a calendar year. 5 In 1956, the law 
6 
was amended to extend coverage to employers of four or more. From the 
beginning, some state size•of-fir~ provisions covered smaller firms 
than the federal statute, while all state laws were at least'as inclu-
sive. Table I shows that on December 31, 1937, employers of eight or 
more employees in all 51 states were covered. At that time nineteen 
stat•s hfd extended ~c,werage \)eyond the federal law to employers of 
less tha~ eight or more. In ten of t~ese states, firms employing one 
or more persons were subject to a state law. The other nine states 
had varying size•of•Jirm provisions ranging from three to five employ• 
ees. 
The trend in state size-of-firm provisions has been to extend 
co~erate to smaller firms. Thus, by December 31, 1953, a total of ten 
additi~mal states ~d joined the original 19 whose laws were broader 
than t~e federal s~atute. Seventeen of the states covered employers of. 
one or more employ!,lleS, and the other twelve states deviating from the 
feder,1 pattern h•i;l laws covering firms of from three to six employees. 
The federal amendment of 1956 prompted all states which had not done so 
previously to extJnd coverage to employers of four or more. By January 
19 1958, 23 statt laws were broader than the federal size-of-firm pro-
17 
vision even after the 1956 amendment. Of these 23, 18 covered employers 
of Qne or more, two of two or more, and four of three or more. Table I 
sum,narizes stat, size-of=firm provisions on selected dates. 
5 Ibid. 9 639 9 642. 6 Ibid., LXX, 804. 
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TABLE I 
STATE SIZE OF FIRM PROVISIONS, 1937, 1953, 1958 
Number of St,ates ···· 
Site of lrirm December, Decemb1r, January, 
Coverage 1937a 1953 1953b 
I ~ more employees 32 32 0 
6 Gr mGre employees 0 2 0 
5 er more employee, 1 0 0 
,• 
4 or more empll.ci>yees 6 • 28 ,,. 
3 M" mGre employees 2 2 3 
2 oo:- more employees 0 0 2 
l or more employees 10 17 18 
Total number states 51 51 ~l 
1:,, 
a. Souce: v. s •• Bureau of Employment Security, Emplopaen;t 
Se~~rity Review, August, 1955, P• 22. 
b. so~rce: u. s., Bureau of Employment Security, C!!J?&risoa 
of State Unemployment Imns111rance Laws !! of January !, 1958, (Unite,4 
States Gcvern.meat Printing Office, Washington, 1958), P• 4. · 
19 
The federal and state provisions utilizing the type-of-firm cri-
teria for determining coverage state that all employment is covered 
except specified types. Aa employer is not subject to the laws 1£ his 
employees perform these services; likewise, his .employees may not 
receive benefits. Originally, the federal statute excluded the follow-
ing types of employment: (l) agricultural labor; (2) .domestic service 
in a private heme; (3) service of officers and crews of vessels on the 
navigable waters of the United States; (4) service of an individual in 
tbe employ of his son, daughter, or spouse, or of a child under 21 years 
in the employ of his father or mother; (5) employment by Federal, state, 
and local governments; (6) employment by non-profit institutions which 
are operated excl1t11sively for religious, charitable, or educational pur• 
7 poseso 
Several modifications have been made in the federal provisions 
col!llcerning excluded employment. In 1938, railroad workers were removed 
from the jurisdiction of the state-federal system and'placed under a 
8 
separate federal program. Also in 1939, agricultural labor was rede-
fined in a manner that excluded some processing and marketing activi-
ties and other services that were included under the original aet. 9 
A~other modification tending to restrict coverage was an amendment to 
the law in 1948 which limited the term rremployee'' to employment under 
coomon law :ruleso The Supreme Court had formerly ruled that "employ-
ment" as defined ia the 1935 act was broad enough to cover services 
s~ch as those performed by outside salesmen. Such salesmen are not 
7-Ibid., XLIX, part 1, 643. 
8tbido 9 LII, 1094. 9Ibid., LIII, part 2, 1360. 
20 
employees under c<munon law; therefore they have not been covered by the 
10 federal sts.t1\llte since 1948. 
Twe meidifications b.ave increased coverage under the federal law. 
The 1939 amendment extended coverage to federal and some state and 
hical instrumentalities not wholly owned by the respective governments. 11 
National banks, among other things, were covered as a result of this 
change. In 1946 9 the federal statute was amended to provide coverage 
f~r most maritime employments. Services performed on a non-American 
vessel outside the U~ited States and services by some fishermen on 
12 
small crafts are yet excluded. 
Provisions in state unemploy~ent compensation laws concerning 
type-of-firm coverage are essentially identical to the federal statute. 
Thus~ with minor exceptions, all s~rv,ices covered by the federal law 
are also covered by the states. Most state laws contain a provision 
stating that any emplcyment covered by the federal law is also covered 
13 by the state statute. 
Chai.nges in federal and state provisions concerning covered employ-
ment 9 along with 1Changes in the farm~non-farm ratio of our population, 
have resulted in an increasingly larger proportion of the labor force. 
be:b11g i@ichided in the sc@pe of the United States unemployment insurance 
system. table II shows the results of these changes for the period 
1938=1958. Note that in 1938 around 36.5 per cent of the civilian 
labor force was covered by unemployment insurance~ By 1953 this 
10 Ibid.~ LXII, part 1, 438. 
11 . 
Ibid., LIII, part 2, 1360. 
ll Ibid.$ LX, part 1, 918. 
13compari~on of State Y\m!tnployment I!sur:4nce La:w~ as ... .21 Janua~y 
l~ 1958, PP• 9, 14. . . 
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TABLE II 
nIE CIVILIAN LAB(!)B. FOR.CE AD EMPLOYMENT COVERED BY STATE LAWS, 1938-1958 
Civilian Employment As A 
Labor Covered Per Cent of 
Year Force Cl- E!!210l!!!ent 6 Labor Force 
(in thousands (in thousands 
of persons) of persons) (%) 
1938 54610 19929 36.5 
1939 55230 21378 38.7 
1940 55640 23Q96 41.5 
1941 55910 26814 48.0 
1942 56410 29349 52.0 
1943 55540 30828 55.5 
1944 54630 30044 55.0 
1945 53860 28407 52.7 
1946 57520 30234 52,3 
1947 60168 32278 . 53.6 
1948 61442 33088 53.9 
1949 62105 31695 51.o 
1950 63099 32887 52.1 
1951 62884 34858 55.4· 
1952 62966 35571 56.5 
1953 63815 36667 57.5 
1954 64468 35372 54.9 
1955 65848 36591 55.6 
1956 67530 39170 58.0 
1957 67946 39876 58.7 
1958 68647 38405 55.9 
a. Source: u. s., Bureau of Labor Statistics, E!Ployment _!!g 
Earnings, February, 1960, P• 1. 
b. Source: u. s., Burea~ of Employment Security, E!Ployment 
,!!! Earnings of Workers Covered II, State Une!Ployment Insurance 
1!!!!,, Fourth Quarter, 1958, Inside Front Cover. 
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percentage had increased t@ 5105. In 1958, 55.9 per cent of the labor 
force had available benefit payments in case of loss of job. 
Other things equ.1 9 the extension af coverage to a larger propor-
tion of the labor f~r~e iimcreases the counter-cyclical qualities of 
unemployment insurance. For the economy as a whole, the volume of ben• 
efits will be directly related to the volume of covered employment. 
Mere experience in ccvered employment does not, however, automatically 
insure financial auista.im~e fC111r any parUcular unemployed individual. 
Eligibility, al~~g with benefit size and duration, depends upon state 
laws. The only federal prfflfision concerning benefits is a stipulation 
restricting sligb:tly t!me c©Jimditions under wllich a state may refuse 
14 benefits to otherwise qualified individuals. 
All state laws c~~tain eligibility requirements for receipt of 
benefits designed to limit paymeats to only these workers regularly 
attached to covered empll.@ymento Thus, an individual must, in ,order to 
draw benefits, have ea.ra®d a stip@lated minimum ameunt during a speci• 
15 fied time period while ~ll.oyed. This minimum amount has been 
increasing and operat~s t@ prevent some otaerwise eligible persons from 
ll.6 
receiving benefit paym.en11:1. 
Each state, cf ~@1!1\1C'Se 9 mas its own formula for determining the 
14 u. s., Stat\l.1ltes at Large, XLIX, part 1., 640. 
15comparisca ~f State ~aempl?Yment Insurance!:!!!!!.!.!. o; January 
!, 1958, p. 49. 
16 .·.·· 
u. s. • BurM\l.11 @f Euq,loymel'llt Security., Employment Security 
~eview, August, 1955, P• 36. 
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size of benefit paymemiu ~imce eligibility is established. Originally, 
t~e states adopted formulae which would produce benefits equal to fifty 
17 per cent of the claimants' full-time weekly wages. When these formu-
lae proved administratively unpractical, provisions began to appear 
basing benefits on the individual's earnings during some past quarter-
year in which wages were highest. By December, 31, 1937, only four 
states prcwided fcr: weakly benefits based exclusively on a worker's 
fuU-time weekly wages. Five states pet:mitted: the agency to adopt an 
unspecified alternativet and 32 states allowed,the high-quarter wage 
f.ormula tc» be 1ll!Sed as an alternative.. Nin, states bas•d benefits 
. , 18 d.irectly 0111\ high=q1lill4rter wages. 
The trend in benefit provisions has been toward a,llowing larger 
payments. This caim be seen by viewing changes in those states which 
base payments on bigh~q\\ll£rter wages -s shown in Table III. Note that 
in 1931 9 35 of the 41 states using this.type of formula paid weekly 
benefits eqWil t~ l/2i cf the unemployed person's high-quarter w~ges, 
~nd ia only six states was ~his fraction larger. In 1954, the fraction 
was higher im 21 states, and in 1958, 20 ~tate~ etN>lCl>Yfd a higher 
fraeticm. 
All state law~ pr<Mride f~r both a mini1J11111D and maximwa benefit. 
The ceiling limitaU«i>llll isl the more :i.mportaat for our purposes. Most 
original laws established a $15-per-week -.xinium on b~•efit payments, 
but this limit increased through the years. ~us by 1954, in no state 
was the maximWlfl as l~w as $15, and by 1958 a ma~imum •slow as $25 
existed in l!ffl.ly 01me state. Table~ summarizes these provisions. 
17 Ibid.» P• 31 .. 
TABLE III 
FRACTIONS USED BY STATES BASING BENEFITS 
ON lU:Glll=QlJARTEB. WAGES, 1937, 1954, 1958 
• Number of States 
24 
Qecember, August, 
1954b 
January, 
Fraction of Bigh=QWLrter Wages :, 1937a 1953e 
1/26 35 6 7 
More thallil 1/26: 6 21 20 
l/25 11 12 
l/24 1 2 
1/23 1 1 
1/20 8 .5 
Variable U/11 to 1/30) 12 
va:rb.\ble (1/11 tiO 1/23) 11 
T@tal Numbering States 41 38 39 
ao Souictu \Jo s. 9 Bueau of Emplcymeat Security, Employment 
Sullllrity l.eview 9 Allllg\lllSt 9 1955 9 po 32. . 
b.. So\lllr(HU u. S~, Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison 
of State Uuempl'llYJ!ent 1Eul11llran.ce Laws y cd Ayust 9 .!2.2!!:., (United 
States Govermueimt Printiag Offic:e 9 W~shington, 1954), P• 57. 
ic. Som-ce: lUo S. 9 Bueau of Employment Security, ·Comparison 
c;>f State tJn.emplLoynaent Insuramce ~ !:!. of January !, .ill!, · 
(United States ~«werR1llllent Printing Office, Washington, 1~5~, po 61. 
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TABLE IV 
MAXIMUM BENEFIT PROVISIONS, 1937, 1954, 1958 
Number of States 
Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount• December, August, January, 1937b 1954c 1958C 
$15 49 0 0 
$16~$20 2 4 0 
$2h$25 0 14 1 
$26.,,$30 0 31 21 
$31-$35 0 1 18 
$36-$45 0 0 10 
Total Number States 51 50 50 
a. This table represents maximum amounts for claimants without 
dependents. In both 1954 and 1958, 11 states paid extra amounts for 
individuals with dependents. For these claimants, maximum amounts 
ranged in 1954 from $26.,,$70 and in 1958 from $30-$70. 
b. Source: U. s., Bureau of Employment Security, Employment 
Security Review, August, 1955, P• 32. 
c . Source: u. s., BUl'eau of Employment Security, C9!Rarison 
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws.!! of August, 1954, (United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1954), P• 60. 
d. Source: u. s., Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison 
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws!.!. of January 1, 1958, 
(United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1~58), P• 65. 
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Liberalization of prov i sions conc~rning the size of benefit pay-
me~ts has resulted in an upward movement in the average weekly benefit 
amount paid. As shown by Table V, this figure increased from $11.06 in 
1941 to $30.58 in 1958. However, in relation to the average weekly 
wages of production employees in manufacturing industries, the weekly 
benefit amount has remained fairly constant since 1941. In both 1941 
and 1958 9 the weekly benefit was 37 per cent of weekly wages (see 
Tab l e V) . 
One more as~ect of the provisions concerning benefits remains to 
be considered. This is benefit duration. The length of time which 
benefits wi ll be paid depends in most states on the length of time 
which the unemployed person worked in covered emplo~ent. Some 
stat esp however~ pr(Wide uniform dura tion for all eligible persons. 
19 Al l states specify a maximwn duration which benefits may be drawn. 
Both the durat.i on determined with reference to prior employment and 
the maximwn time which benefits can be paid have been increasing since 
20 the inception of the program. 
Provisions not discussed affect the volume of benefit payments, 
but the major ones h~ve been considered. The net effect of changes has 
been to increase the size of the program in terms of additions which 
it makes to the i~co~e s tream. Figure I showing benefit payments for 
the period 1938-1 958 reflects this clearly. Although periodic fluctu-
ations occur (as is e~pected)p the upward trend is unmistakable. 
19 Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws!.!. of January 
!, 1958P PP• 72-77. 
20 Emp loyment Security Review, August, 1955, PP• 36, 37. 
TABLE V 
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES COMPARED 
WITH AVERAGE WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTp 194! 9 1954s 1958 
Year 
Item 1941 1954 1958 
--
Average Week!y Wage~ dollars 29.58 11 086 83.50 
Average- Renefit ~ d.ollars 11.06b 24. 93b 30.58c 
Percentage - aenefit of weekly wage 37 35 37 
a. Source: u. s. , Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, May 1, 1960, p. 29. 
b. Source: u. S., Bureau of Employment Security, Employment Security Review, August, 1955, P• 18. 
c. S~urce: u. s., Social .secur ity Administration, Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical 
Supplement, 1958, P• 12. 
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Figure 1. Benefit payments and contributions under state unemployment compensation programs (based on 
data obtained ,from Social Security; Bulletins published by the United States Social Security 
Administration.) -
a. Contributions include unemployment excise tax levied by the federal government. 
b. Benefits exclude payments made in 1954 and subsequent years under the Unemployment Compensation 
for Federal Employees Act and payments made in 1958 unde_r the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act. 
~ .. •· . 
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Size of Contributions 
We have yet to consider the magnitude of the automatic device 
from its other side; that is, its operations in diminishing income. As 
stated earlier, the program is financed through the contributions of 
employers to state unemployment trust funds. Excise tax collections 
by the federal government must also be considered. Thus, the extent 
t~ which the system will diminish income depends on the volume of 
c(l)Nered employment 9 tax.able payrolls, state contribution rates, and 
the federal tax rate. 
Covered employment has previously beea discussed and was found to 
have increased. The federal excise tax was originally set at 3 per 
cent of taxable payr@lls, but all states immediately set contribution 
rates at levels that red~ced the federal rate to 0.3 per cent. This 
2ll. 
rate has since been maintained. 
Besides the v@lume of covered employment,.the size of taxable pay-
rolls depends up~n tmll.t p~rtion of the total payrolls of covered 
employment which is s~bject to the state and federal laws. The orig-
iimail federal act included the entire wages of all ccvered employees. 
bwt a 1942 amendment excluded all over the first $3000 of the empley-
22 
ee's annual earniimgs. State provisions have f~llowed the federal 
states, employers paid taxes and contrib~tions on only the first $3000 
:u Comparison of·State Unemployment Insurance~!.! of January 
.!, 1958, PP• 17, 18. 
22 U. S. 9 Stat~tes !!. l.ar&!., LVI, part 1, 732. 
30 
23 
of their employees' annual earnings . The r esult is t hat contributions 
are smaller t han they would be in the absence of such provisions. For 
instance 9 taxable payrolls were in the second quarter of 1958 around 
24 80 per cent of total wages of cover ed wor kers. Total covered wages, 
however, have increased, being in 1957 a lmost four times greater than 
in 1938. 25 
An important pri!:»Vision for our purposes , wr i t t en into the original 
federal act, is a stipulation allowing employers to off set against 
their federal tax liability, in addition to contribut ions, amounts they 
were excused from contributing in connec tion with state employment 
26 
experience, rating provisions . These provisions make an employee's 
contribution rate depend on his employment (or unemployment) record. 
An individual employer's rate will vary directly with the amount of 
benefits which are paid to his former employeeso 
The relatively low level of unemployment during the war years 
creating l arge accum~lations in the unemployment trust f und prompted 
states to introduce modifications in experience~rating provis ions 
designed to reduce contribution rates and the volume of contr ibutions. 
Thus the average contrib~tion rate for the nation fell f rom a high of 
2.7 per cent in 1938 to below 1. 5 per cent in 1955. 27 
23 Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws!!. of January 
!» 1958, p. 11 . 
24 U. S. 9 Burea~ of Employment Secur ity, Emp loyment and Wages .2f 
Workers Covered .2Y. St~te Unemployment Insurance Laws » Second Quarter , 
1958 9 P• 6. 
25 Ibid. 9 p. 7. See also May» 1950 issue , p . 8 . 
26 u. S. 9 Statutes at Large» XLIX, part 19 643 . 
27 Empl0yment Security Review9 Augus t, 1955, P• 28 . 
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The reduction in the ~ontribution rate, however, was more than 
@ffset by the increase i~ payrolls during the period 1938-1958. The 
res~lt has been an increase in the size of subtractions from the income 
stream caused by the ~nemployment insurance system. Figure I reflects 
the upward trend in the total v:oiluime of con.tributions plus federal 
excise tax c@llections. 
The foreg@ing analy$is has revealed an absolute increase during 
the peri~d 1938~1958 in b~th additions t~ and subtractions from income 
ma.de by the automatic idlevice. The relative size of the device can be 
ascertained by c®mparin; the difference between contributions and ben-
efits with nati@nalL in~())m~o Table VI reveals that in no year since 
th~ incefti@l!i\ of the pr@gr~m has this difference been as much as one 
pier cel!i\t @f ilOlcoime. llill thi&ll semse 9 \\l\K'il~m]!)l@yme!llt insurance is an 
in$ignificant part @f the nati@nall. economy. 
In any given yearp h@wever 9 it is possible for the program to 
exert c@nsiderabl!.e infl\\l\~nce. Thi~ can be seen by c~mparing changes 
iim the exces&ll oif te@1llltribmiti©ll'l\il.! over beilllld:its with @hanges in national 
illll©@me. Thesie cOJmpariH>llll~ ani shOJW1rA in Tabl!.e VII. Note that in the 
c@!l!.trac.tiolOlary year$ @f 1945 9 l!.949 9 1954 9 and 1958, the device obtained 
SQlme sig;lD'.ifiicanc.e. The year Jl.958 h e<ispeieiaUy notable; national 
in«:::iQJme changed @llllly $300 mill:ii:Q>n, but the excess of contributions over 
bel!llefitlil chai.imged $1 .. 8 biU:i~llll.. In the absence of any unemployment 
ilrhsural!llce pr@gr~m, it is Hk(dy twit inc@me WOJ\dd have suffered a 
decline cf m~re $evere pr@p~rti~nso 
TABLE VI 
COMPARISO:I BETWEEN NATIONA.L INC~ AND TB DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS, 1938°1958 
Diff~rence Betwee!!ll Coatrib1l1tions and Benefits 
Naticn~l C@rmtribtJJtions Belll\ef 1 ts ner Per·Cent of 
32 
Year Inc«:m!le" ner Benef itsb Ct01liltr ibut i<0>rnsb National ·income (B!U:fo!!llS (th@itll&aimds olE ( t T!lOtlllHU!.dS of 
of D@Uars) d«>Uaris) dclla:rs) (%) 
1938 61.6 524p000 ()). 715 
1939 n.a 5ll.0p000 0.101 
1940 81.6 440 9 5ll.ll. 0.540 
Jl.94 lL 104. 1 ' 7609024 o.726 
l942 131.1 911 9762 0.667 
1943 uo.J 19'&069699 o.sa, 
1944 181.6 1»438, ll.54 0.7$8 
ll945 181.2 900,422 
·' 
0.497 
1946 180.9 1206 o.oq4 
1947 198.2 5~4 9 598 0.2.55 
U48 223.5 41894l~ .0.187 
ll.949 2U .. 1 ', 521Lii5Jl.8 0.240 
ll95Cl 241.9 410105 0.011 
1951 219.J 8810111 0.318 
ll952 292.2 635p05i3 o.:u.1 
l953 :l05i.6 6390195 0.209 
1954 JC.lJlo8 605 9405 0.201 
1955 330.2 1659634 0~050 
1956 350.8 403 »080 o.us 
1951 366.5 13 9 9 ~~6 0.033 
)1958 366.i ll.o1Jl.2 9 J1l4 0 .. 468 
2... S@\\Jllr:'@~: l!Jl. S. 9 ®lffi@~.of Bu-,dneiu E@@Jn\(J)mics, Busineu 
Statisti@s 9 ll959» p. 1 
b. s~ur@e: Cont:rib1!llti@~s alil\d Beim~fits data ~btained from 
re.l~vant iH\\JlH o.f the· S~@ial StM~\\llrity ·· J!hnUeti!!ll publhned by t::he. 
Umited States. Soi@i£1 Se@1!ll1t'ity Admin.httati<li»ffllo Ann.ual. differenc,s 
betwe~n the twl!l> were tkeim @@imputed. Benefit paym~nter made in 1954 
aimcfil subseq\\Jlent yea:r.s 'llllmlde:r the UnempJ!.«,))yme1mt · C@mpell!lsa~i@n. for Fed"" 
eral E\llllpll.~yees A@t and payments made in l958 1!lmde:r th, Temporary 
Unemmpl@yme1!i\t Iims@:ran@e A©t were ex@litllded f:rioou @@mputations. Ccn° 
tributi@ns in@ll\\llde \\ll1!i\~l@y~e1!i\t ex@ise tax levied by the federal 
g@lwer$1lellilt. 
l'H,r 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
ll.944 
1945 
1946 
1941 
ll948 
1949 
1950 
ll.951 
l952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
Jl956 
1951 
1958 
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TABLE VI I 
CHAN~ES Di NATIONAL INCOME AND Tim EXCESS OF 
C~N'l'I.J!'.JB~IONS OVER BENEFITS, 1939-19584 
·changes iim t&e Changes in. the 
Excess Gf , Excess as a 
Chang~s illll COJ111trib111Jti.cns Per 'Cent of Changes 
Nittit•l lllll~•ea.. oivet lBemuef itsb 
.. 
in National Inceme 
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b. The pll.us au~ miiilus signs in thi1 colmim require some explana-
titO>n. Note in Table VI t~t contribution~ exceeded benefits in 1938 
by $524,000 9 000 9 a.11Mll in ll.9'l9 by $.510 9 000,00G. TlnAS 9 in. 1939, con.tri-
1:rniU(QlllllS exceeded bene:U.ts by $14,000 9 000 leu tun they did in .1938; 
heiilce, a min\!Jls. ili,gn h rt!lqmiired f4'ir 1939. In years in wh,ich benefits 
ex~eed CtQ>iiltrib1llltitO>iilS» the a.mtQ>\!Jlllllt is added~~ the am~\lJlnt in the previous 
year by which c@ntrib11Jlti@ns exceeded benefits. The $908,228,000 smcwn 
opp@site 1946 in this tablt!l is the smmu.ti~n Q)f the $900,422,000 and the 
$1\806,000 shimm. illll Table WI OJ?p<Olsite UAt!l yea1rs 1945 and 1946 respect= 
ivell.y. The year 1946 req@ires a mimus sign since c©ntributions exceeded 
benefits by a les1er am@~~t in that year than they did in 1945. 
The analysis of the magnitude of the automatic device is com• 
pleted. An absolute increase in the size of both additions and sub• 
tractions has been revealed from the discussion. The study now 
focuses in the following chapter upon the nature of the ~,vice. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ECONOMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSt'.IBANCE 
An analysis of the nature of the autGllatic device involve• the 
economics of unemployment insurance.· It is an attempt to ascertain the 
economic impact upon the ecoaomy of benefit payments, contributions, 
and other aspects of the program. Ia other words, how does the system 
affect income, employment, prices, and resource allocation? This 
chapter is meant, in a general way, to toucn upon this question. The 
analysis will first consider separately the economics of contributions, 
benefit payments, and trust fund operations. Afterwards, the program 
will be viewed in its entirety. Lastly, and more relevant to our pur-
pose, the theory of built•in stabilization will be examined and the 
unemployment compensation system compared with the workings of this 
theory. 
Con.tributioas 
Since contributions to the state unemployment insurance trust 
funds are derived mostly from a payroll tax on employers, an analysis 
of the economics of contributions involves the question of tax inci-
dence. It is important to:determine who actually bears the financial 
costs of the programs, since economic activity is likely to be affected 
differently according to whose income is reduced. 
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For instance, if the employer is able to shift the tall: to the 
worker, the reduction in the wage earner's income may have adverse 
effects on aggregate demand for goods and services. On the other hand, 
if wage reductions do not result, unemployment pressures may be 
strengthened. Any price increases due to the forward shifti1;1g Gf the 
tax may result in a reduction of aggregate output. An unfavorable 
effect on investment expenditures may occur 1£ the employer is f~reed 
to bear the tax himself. The problem of resource allocation is also 
involved since an increase in labor costs may encourage th• intropuc-
tion of labormsaving devices. 
Seymour Harris points out that econ001ists were, prior to the 
passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, in general agreement that 
1 
a payroll tax will ultimately be passed on to the wage earner. This 
position is very succinctly expressed by Russell Bauder. After refµt-
ing the contention that under certain circumstances a payroll tax will 
i . ' 
be shifted forward, Bauder states that if the margi1;1al pt-oductivity 
theory of wages is accep~ed, the conclusion is inescapable that the 
wage earner will bear the tax. He reasons that since the tax repre-
sein~s an increase in labor costs, there are only two possibilities: 
2 lower wages or unemployment. 
The position taken by Bauder rests upon the marginal productiVitf 
theory of wages and the assumption of perf•ct competition. The conclu• 
sion that the tax is shifted backward is the logical outcome of the 
1 Seymour E. Harris, Ec¢inomics af Social Security (New York, 1941), 
p. 285. 
2Russell Bauder, "The Probable Incidence of Social Security 
Taxes, 11 Americ.an Economic Review, 26 (1936), P• 465. 
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type of aulysis wh.ich postulates an individual firm in a competitive 
sitwition and ~xamines the firm's actions when faced with an increase 
in its marginal labor costs. Since wages are conditioned by the mar-
ginal worth of the worker and market price is not subject to influence, 
the employer's only recourse is to reduce output and ~loyment. The 
permanence of the unemplGym,nt and reduced output will depend on the 
worker's willingness to accept lower wages. 
Some writers had s~ggested that to the extent that unemployment 
insM1rance taxes are impHed t.llniversally! tne employers will be able to 
3 
raise prices and shift the tax to the consumer. Bauder and others, 
• 
maiimtaining the position that the wage earner pays, answered this sug-
gestion with an argument that the collection of payroll taxes does 
n«:»thing to increas~ the nCGney supply. Any upward mfi1Vement in pi-ices 
wolllJid therefore necessita~e a reduction imi output. But, this argument 
c~ntinues, if perfect ccmpetition is assmned and the marginal product-
-
ivity th~ory of wages is operative, there is no reason to conclude that 
4 
o~tput will be permanently reduced. Under these assumptions, the 
~~iversality of the tax is not relevant. 
The disc~sSi$~ which followed the passage of the Social Security 
Act of 1935 revealed m~ch divergence of opinion concerning the inci-
dence of a payroU tax. As indicated by the foregoing analysis, early 
writers emphasized lo~g0 rtm. considerations. Barris points out that 
after 1935 9 economists began to emphasize short-run considerations more 
s,;maim before, and were mox-e prone to support the position that the tax 
3 Eveline M. l~rns, Toward Social Securi1=,I (New York, 1936), pp. 
158, 159. 
4 Bauder, P• 463. 
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might be passed en to consumers. The general position that the tax is 
ultimately shifted backward. was with modification maintained. 5 
Writing in 1940, Sumner Slichter exemplifies fairly well the 
approach that was being utilized at that time. He first considers 
shortQrun effects of the imposition of a payroll tax. His conclusions 
are that the wage earners, consumers and employers will initially share 
the cost. Then he views the situation from the long run. There are 
three theories, he says: (1) The ta~ will produce higher prices and 
comasumers will pay. (l) the tax will move the demand curve of lab.or 
t~ the left altlld lab• wUl pay. (3) The tax will reduce the rate of 
interest and property crwners will pay. Slichter seems to support the 
sec~md pesitioltll 9 alth~•gh he states that it must be modified in cases 
6 
of admilllistered wage setting. 
Devel~pments in the~ry along the lines indicated by Harris and 
Slichter have continued to the present. This is reflected in a state• 
ment made by Eveline Burns in 1956: '1The weight of economic opinion 
seems t~ be that it (payr~ll tax) is in fact ultimately passed on in 
large meas-m:e to c~~s\\l!mers ••• and to wage earners ••• but that 
7 
some part unde:r 11M::llim~c~etitive 11:onditioms falls on prCi>fits." Burns 
goes on to express the opill'!ion that the unemployment insurance payroll 
tax has a greater chance of falling on profits to the extent that it is 
5 Harri:$, P• 286. 
6 Sumn.er a. Slichter, uThe Impact of Social Security Legislation 
Upon MobUit:y and Enterprise," American Economic Review 30 (Marcli, 
1940 s~pplement) 52~55. 
1 ff'..,,': ,l , .. : •• ,.. ·! '. i ' -: ! "·., ," v-;. ··1 -~ .. : 1 ~ '. ····· q_ 1 -~ :· ''! 
1. ·. Ew1.dimi® JMI •. lvllll~, S1!))ci£l Secwlty and P~blic Policy, (New Y0t'k, 
1956) ~ pp ... 161, 1,2. 
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frietqllllient excll.llllsion of sma.U employers and the existence of experience 
rating arrangements mak~s the tax discriminatory. 
Note that it is :m@ l(l)nger rigidly maintained that the wage earner 
will ultimately bear the c~st of unemployment insurance. This develop• 
ment appears t® ari$e Qllllt of the tendency to emphasize non-competitive 
vity the@ry @f wages. Als~~ JLat~r writers feel that the universality 
Th® ~@rmclLllllsi@~ reached by later writers complicates the analysis 
s&mewhat. If it is maintained that the tax will be shifted to the 
The exatct prlQlp@rtiQJrm b@rne by these three .groups is hel!.d to be much 
inflllllenced by th~ e~on@mic conditions prevailing at the time the tax 
was first l~vied amd shortly thereafter and by the characteristics of 
thl!t iimdiwiidl@Sl1 bMlluiiiltry ••• 'l'he ability ©Jf an individual employer to 
@hift the tax will vary i~ some measure with the elasticity of demand 
f@r his pr@~\!Jlct» its am~imability to concealed price increases ••• 
the strM©t\!Jlre of the pricil!ilg system ••• the degree of the organiza-
ti@l!il of hh lab@r f@rce, thte feasibility of substituting machiner~ for 
lsb@r~ the ratio of wages to all costs ••• and similar matters. 
811bid. 
91'bidq po 163. 
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Thus the incidence of the payroll tax is seen to depend on a 
multitude of factors, and it is no longer maintained that it will be 
shifted backwards or shifted at all, for that matter. It is, however, 
usually maintained that the employer will escape most of the burden, 
and if any falls o~ him, it is the differential above the minimum tax 
which is initially imposed on all firms. That the tax, under certain 
circumstances, may be shifted forward is usually admitted. 
In this section, we have concerned ourselves exclusively with the 
effects of contributions a111d their incidence. Before arriving at any 
final conclusions concerning the financial burden of unemployment 
insurance, it is necessary to consider the impact of benefit payments 
on our economy. 
Benefit Paymu.ts 
Superficially 9 the eco~omic impact of benefit payments is fairly 
self=evident. Persons receiving benefits are, of course, unemployed, 
and would otherwise be forced to draw upon personal savings or borrow 
in order to subsist. It seems reasenable to assume that in any period 
in which benefit payments are made, c0nsmnption expenditures will be 
greater than they would have been in the absence of the payments. 
WU:hout doubt, the payments themselves act as a stimulus during periods 
of-~nemployment. 
In this regard, benefit payments may have a somewhat unexpected 
effect during relatively short periods of economic fluctuations. It is 
possible that the effect of payments during short periods of unemploy-
ment will be merely to eliminate the necessity for the unemployed worker 
to draw upon savings er borrow~· Under this assumptiQJt, consumption 
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expem,dit1lllrH would have been as high without unemployment insurance. 
However., the stimulus is merely transferred to the initial upswing 
phase of the cycle. The re0 employed will eater this ·period in better 
financial condition, and consumption needs will not be sacrificed be• 
cause of the necessity to rebuild savings accounts or repay debts. 
Much has been. said about the possible adverse effects which bene• 
fit payments may have on WGrker mobility and incentive. Slichter feels 
that mobility is affected very little because those workers who have 
been employed long enc\lllgh t«l) qualify for benefits are not ordinarily 
10 part of the mobile work foo:ee anyway. The arrangements between states 
which permit a worker to receive benefits for which he has qualified in 
o~e state althcugh he has moved to another state should at least reduce 
ll the adverse effects upon mobility. 
It is uswtlly ass1lll11led that benefit payme~ts are too small in rela-
tiionm to f\lJlU=oir ev®im part-time wages to appreciably af.fect worker incea-
tive. F\lllrthermo,re» it appears that most workers would rather be 
employed than idle and drawing benefits. 
There is, h~wever~ the possibility that the supply curve of labor 
will be S@m.aw1aat influenced by unemployment insurance benefits. This 
co\lllld happen in at least tw~ ways: (1) By increasing the reservaticm. 
price of labor. (2) By strengthening the bargaining power of unions. 
The fact that an uimemployed worker has some income will supposedly 
make him more partic\llllar abGut the type -of job which he receives and 
10 Sliehter, P• 468. 
11To the extent that "red i!t:ape" and bureaucratic inefficiency make 
it difficult to receive these inter-state payments, the adverse effect 
wiU remain. 
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the wage rate he accepts. It could happen that unfilled vacancies will 
exist concurrently with unemployed workers' receiving .benefit payments. 
On the other hand, the program has probably been helpful in preserving 
the skills of the unemployed. As Ewan Clague says, ''We must be very 
eautio~s in rushing to the conclusion that the first thing we must do 
for an unemployed un is to push him int() a job, any job, as quickly as 
ll.2 posd.bleo" 
Sli~hter, howewe~, feell.s that an incr~ase in the reservation price 
of ll.abor woMid affect tne ability of our economy to recover from con-
tractionary periodso Alth~ugh the wages ef existing firms will not be 
affected because these wages are set by the employed, benefit payments 
may discowage new enterprises. Slichter maintains that wages are 
historically and necessarily lower among new firms and any increase in 
the wage rate whiii::h \l.1l!lllieiffljpli.~y1Jd individuall.s are willing to accept may 
13 dampen expansionary f@rces by discouraging new businesses. 
A second way in which benefit payments may affect the supply of 
ll.ab@r is by strengthening ~nions. The fact that a source of income is 
available for unemployed persons may eliminate, or at least reduce, 
any consideration which a union may have given t~ the effects of its 
Let us now take a closer look at the influence which benefit pay-
ments have on aggregate demand for goods and services. At the same 
time we can reconsider the question of tax incidence by viewing the 
combined impact of contributions and benefits upon the economy. 
12 Ewan Claglllle, uThe Economic Aspects of an Integrated Social 
Sec~rity Program," American Economic Review 26: 123. 
13 Slicnter, PP• 56, 57. 
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Earlier it was shown that contributions tend either to be shifted 
to the wage earner or consumer. If the wage earner is forced to reduce. 
his wages, then money income in the economy is reduced. On the other 
handp if the consumer pays, output may be reduced. Tmis is, of course, 
a reduction in real natic:mal income. Contributions per se are undoubt-
edly c~ntracticnary. 
If, ·however, benefit payments shift the aggregate demand for goods 
and services rightward a sufficient amount to offset the contractionary 
influence of contrib~t1~ns 9 the combined effect of both forces will be 
neutral. This appears t~ be a logical occ11U'rence in periods when bene-
fit payments equal contributions. Under these assumptions, the 
increased demand will eliminate the necessity of lower wages and/or a 
14 
reduction in output because of higher prices. This leads to the con-
clusion that the c~st of the program does, indeed, fall on the eonsu-
e ~ •• 
15 
mer. When e~ntributi~ns exceed benefits, the net effect will, of 
eo~rse, be eontractioima.ry, and the former analysis concerning tax 
incidence still holds. 
One point sh~uld be made clear. To say that the combined effect 
of contributions and benefit payments is neutral, contractionary, or 
expansioimary is not equivalent to saying that the effect of the entire 
unemployment insurance program is similar. The operations of the trust 
fund must be considered before final statements are made. The fund 
monies may be distributed in such a way as to modify the effects rather 
14 Harris, P• 250. 
15tt might be added that this is not a true net addi~ional social 
cost~ In the absence ~f any unemployment insurance progr4• at all, th~ 
burden of unemployment falls entirely on the unemployed peq~le. 
44 
ulll,expectedll.y. 
The Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund 
The Social Security Act provides for the establishment in the 
Treasury of the United States of an Unemployment Trust Fund. Into this 
F~n.d are deposited all cG~tributions collected by state agencies. 
Beaefitt payments are made out of the Fund. The Secretary of the Treas• 
ury is responsible for investing any excess of contributions over 
benefit payments in interest-bearing obligations of the United States 
16 
or in obll.igations guara~teed by the federal government. The practice 
has been to res.trict the investment to United States Bonds and special 
· 17 issues are frequently ''scld'' to the Fund. The effects of these oper• 
ations is the topic presently under discussion. Of course, if coli.tri• 
b~ticns never exceeded benefits, we would b.ave nothing to discuss. 
Tnis is not the case. In au but four years since the inception of the 
18 program, an excess has been available for investment. Most of the 
following discussion will deal with this condition. 
There are three different assumptions which may be made concern-
bag Fund operations: (ll.) The imvestment of excess contributions. in 
United States obligations (or the sale of obligations by the Fund when 
benefits exceed contrib~tions) affects neither the rate of interest nor 
the expenditure, berr•ing and taxing activities of the govermnent. 
(2) The Fund's dealimgs in securities do affect the rate of interest, 
16 U. s., S.tat\Jltes .!!: Large, XLIX, 642. 
17social Secwrity B~lletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1958, 
P• 13. 
18 See Table VI, P• 32. 
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and government borr@Wing plans, but no other fiscal activity. (3) Fund 
operations affect the expenditure activities of the federal government. 
The first assumptiGn simply sterilizes the funds as far as the 
ec~aomy is concerned. In this sense, they are similar to a general 
fund tax surplus n~t used te liq~idate debt. This effect would be 
realized if the Treasury allowed the funds to remain idle on deposit 
with the Federal Res~rve Banks. Under this assumption, the unemploy• 
me~t insurance is, with~~t much question, c~ntractionary in any period 
in which ccntrib~ti~ns exceed benefit payments. 
The sec~nd ass1t1mpti~~ allows fer F~nd operations to affect the 
b@rrowing activities ~f the Treasury and thereby the rate of inter•st. 
Thi; mea~s that the f~nds are used to retire other debt, or that 
beca~se of the availability of these f~nds, not as much borrowing is 
dGl!lle fr\Qlm the geimeral p1l!lblico In either case 9 the rate of interest is 
fowered and investmemt is sUm~lated. Viewed in another way, invest• 
mel!llt f1l!lnds which would have been req~ired by the federal government 
are now free to seek investment elsewhere or possibly to be spent on 
collllS\lllmption go@ds. Under this asswnption, the contractionary influence 
of the program cannot be meas~red by the size of trust fund accumula~ 
tions. The dispositi@llll of these excess c@ntributions exerts an, expan-
sionary iimfl~ence. It is d~@btf@l, however, that this would completely 
offset the dampeni~g effect which the payrwll tax creates. In effect, 
money is transferred from ate'tive spenders (employers, workers, consu-
mers) to inactive spe~ders (former holders of gfflrernment securities). 
The third ass~mption p~stulates that, in effect, the Treasury (or 
Congress) looks ~pon the Fund as an additional source of revenue and 
uses the money borrfflifed frt@m the Fund f~r Cfflrrent expenditures on 
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goods and services. The taxing and borrowing (exclusive of special 
issues to the Fund) plans of the Treasury remain the same as they would 
\ 
have been in the absence of the unemployment insurance program. This 
assumption leads to tne unusual conclusion that in periods when contri• 
butions exceed benefits, the net effect of unemployment insurance in 
e~r econmny will be expansiolt'l&ry. This is so because theoretically the 
gOJVermnent expenditures m~ltiplier is always greater than either the 
tax or tra~sfer multiplier. Since excess contributions tend to be 
greater in periods of economic expansion. the program w.0uld tend to add 
to the expansion rather than detract from it if this assumption con• 
forms to reality. 
It is probably true, as Harris says, that not much weight sh.ould 
19 be attached to its validity. Altnough evidence supporting any post• 
tion would be diffic~lt to find, it appears that the first assumption 
discussed above is a logical one, although the second assumption may 
have some validity. Vader either assumption, in any period in.which 
funds accumulate, the program can be considered contractionary; and, 
by the same tokea 9 in any period in which funds are diminished, an 
expansionary effect eaa be assumed. 
B~ilt-In Stabilization 
The discussion of conditions under which the unemplQ)'ment insur• 
anee program is likely to be contractionary or expansionary is more 
directly related to the theme of this study. We now turn to a consid-
eration of built~in stabilization. Our main concern here is to define 
19 li1<1rris, p. 70. 
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more precisely that term and to determine hei>W snugly the program fits 
the definition. 
If a program is built in to our economy, it operates automatically 
aceordi•g to pre•establisaed rules which need not be substantially mod-
ified under differing economic circumstances. Aut0m&ticity implies the 
absence of discretionary action. Theoretically, the only decision 
necessary is the one which. initia1;'es the program and formulates the 
rules for its operation. Subsequent action is merely complying with 
these rules. 
Now a word about economic stabilizers. If a program acts as a 
stabilizer, it -will prevent fluctuations in economic activity from 
being as pronounced as tney would _be ia the absence of the program. 
It is, of course, impossible to determine what would have happened in 
the absence of something that does, in fact, exist. However, if it is 
found that unemployment insurance sets in motion forces which tend to 
reduce the amplitude of fluctuations in economic activity, it can be 
referred to as a stabilizer. 
By way of illustration, let national income be used as a measure 
of economic activity. If, when nati0nal income increases for any rea-
son, the program automatically sets in motion forces which tend to 
decrease income, it is a built-in stabilizer. By the same t0ken, the 
program must act in an expansionary manner when income declines. Note 
that nothing has been said concerning the degree of counter-cyclical 
qualities. The existence of a force is in question in this chapter, 
1ui>t its strength, assuming one is found. 
That the unemployment insurance program operates automatically is 
evident. It is true that changes in the laws are made every ye,~r and 
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the program has undergone S1Ubstantial development since its inception. 
These changes •re net, however, made in direct response to, and do not 
necessarill.y coincide with, changes in economic activity. On the other 
hand, the program responds directly and necessarily to certain develop• 
ments in the economy. Ima short, unemployment insurance operates auto-
matica.U.y. 
The q~estion of stability cannot be answered so simply. Several 
asp~cts aif the prwgr.ua tend to prevent or weaken its counter-cyclical 
effects. In terms (!11.f stability, contributiGns must vary directly with 
in@ome. Since they depend te some extent on the size of payrolls, a 
rise in natioimal .incmne ca~sing a rise in payrolls will increase con• 
tributions. 
The levy of the tax~ only the first $3000 of the employee's 
amnuaJl. earnings may, l\llnder certain conditions. limit this development. 
Dooring periods of declining b\lllsiness activity, the worker may have his 
ho\lllrs re.d\lllced rather thall'l\ be dismissed.. A smaller annual wage bill 
will not necessarily red1lllce &1l'l\ employer's tax liability if no worker's 
anll'l\\lll&l earnill'l\gs are red\lllced below $3000. It may therefore happen that 
the emplcyer's tax liability as a per cent of total wages (or sales) 
will in~r~ae im a peri@d ~f declining activity. 
Experience-rating arrangements also tend to limit the counter-
cyclical qu.U.ty of contributions. As mentioned in Chapter II, under 
these arrangements an employer's contribution rate will be smaller to 
the ex.teat that his empl~~es (or former employees) do not draw benefit . '?, 
payments~ For the economy as a whole, this aspect .of the program 
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~perates t~ decrease c~ntributions when employment increases (unemploy-
ment decreases). Since employment and income ordinarily move together, 
experience=rating arrangements insert a pre-cyclical force into the 
~nemploym.ent insw:ance system. 
Provisions clQ>ncuim:i.img these arrangements vary from state to state. 
All» h0wever 9 are devised te establish the relative experience of in.di• 
vidlWi.l employers with ~neimployment or with benefit costs. In 1958. 
tl'lll~re w~re five dhtillll4:lt systems in use. They are usually identified 
as (JL) reserve=rati@» (2) benefit=ratio, (3) benefit•wage ... ratio, 
20 (4) ciompensable0 separati@ns, and (5) payr~ll decline. 
The reserve0 ratiw f~rmula is used in 33 states. Under this system, 
a separate acco~nt is kept fo~ each empl~yer in wbich is .recorded the 
am~~nt of his pay:r@ll, his ccatributi0ns, aad the benefits paid to his 
wG>rkers. The extp1pl®)l'el!:' 1 s cointr:lbution. rate is determined with reference 
t~ a ratio er fracti~~. The excess of the employer's contributions 
<Wer his benefits constit~tes the fracti@m's numerator; its denominator 
represents the empllO!ye:r 's payrolll.r The larger the fraction, the' smaller 
the contrib~tion rate, &nd vice versa. In m~st states using this for~ 
inception of the pr~gr£m in the state. The denGminator usually 
21 
reflects the employer's payroll for the past three years. 
It f~llows fr©lm the above that under this plan, an employer's con~ 
tributi~n rate will decrease if (1) his payr~ll decreases, (2) his 
contrib~tions increase, er (3) the benefits paid to his workers 
20 C~mparis~n @f St~te Unemployment Insurance~ as of January 
! 9 1958, po 250 
21 Ibidop ppo 25, 260 
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de~reas~. Hh rate wiU rise if the reverse of these developments 
@~~us •. It is imp©lrtall1\t to note that the most decisive factor in estab-
lishing the rate is the level of benefits and changes in this level. 
This is because the payr~ll and contributions move tGgether; their 
m~weme1t1lts will tell1ld t~ !(b~t not necessarily) leave unaffected the ratio 
upon which the rat~ is based. The contribution rate tends therefore to 
va~y directly with bell1lefits. Since benefits vary inversely with 
ar~a~gemell1lt tends t@ weak~1l1l the stabilizing qWllity of contributions. 
the emplcyer 0s co1t1ltributio~ rate is determined with reference to the 
ratio of be1t1lefits f~r tae past three years to the employer's payr0ll 
f~r the same periOJd. Again, the higher the ratio, or fraction, the 
22 l~wer the rate 9 a~d vice versa. The excl~sion of contributions from 
the f~rm~la makes the rati@ depend more directly upon benefit level 
than in the case of the reserve=ratio system. The benefit-ratio for-
m~laj thereforep. affects even more adversely the stabilizing aspects 
of eontributi@ns than does the reserve=ratio plan. 
Th~ be1!1lefitbwage=rati~ formula is used in six states. T~e employ• 
er's contribution rate under this plan depends on the ratio of his 
''be1!1lef it wages 11 to his t«:!!tal taxable wages. 'l'he rate varies directly 
with this ratio. ''Benefit wages 1• represent for the mGst part wages 
wh~ch were paid t~ the empleyer's workers who s~bsequently drew, bene~ 
fiu. In com.putiimg t!ihe ratio, a three .. year period is used for both 
taxable wages am.cl ''beimefit wages." This formula is designed to raise 
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i~ contributions an amount equal to tb.at paid out in benefits. For the 
state as a whole, the dollar value of benefits per dollar of ''benefit 
wages" is computed during the immediately preceding three-year period. 
This figure is the dollar value of contributions to be raised per dol-
].ar of ''benefit wages." The total amount to be raised is then distr:1-
b~ted amo~g employers accl!Wrding to their benefit-wage ratio; the higher 
23 the rati@ 9 the higher the rate. To the extent tb.at this formula pro• 
d~ces the res~lts for which it is designed, a change in benefits will 
always cause a cha~ge of like amount in contributions. The stabilizing 
aspects ef the program would be virtually eliminated if the formula 
wcrked perfectly. 
The compensable~separations formula, used in only one state, is 
similar to the bemefit~wage•ratio system. Rates are set so they will 
va:ry directly with belll.eifit payments causing contributions to rise when 
bem.efits begin. t<GJ decrease the state's ulll!pp,}cyment trust fund. 24 
Stability consideratiom.s» n«l)Wever, would require contributions to fall 
Follllr states employ the payroll variations formula for establishi~g 
~cm.trib~ticn rates. Under this plan, an employer's contribution rate 
depends on the percentage which his payroll declines during a specified 
period. The smaller this percentage» the smaller the rate. A decline 
in activity and employment, therefore, ca~ses the rate to rise. 25 
Again, the rate tends to vary directly with benefits and unemployment, 
partially offsetting the stabilizing qualities of contributions. 
23 Ibid.» P• 28. 24 Ibid., P• 29. 
25 tbid.. 29 '110 • PP• · , J. • 
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AU of the pll.ans tend to cause contributions to be less counter .. 
cyclical than they would be if contribution rates were not varied at 
all.· Experiencegrating arrangements, however, nave been defended on 
other grounds. It is felt by some writers that the employer is 
encouraged to stabilize his employment if by so doing he can reduce his 
rate. Also 9 these arrangements help protect the solvency of the trust 
fundi and 9 by the same token, prevent an excessive fund balance from 
being accU\11lulated. 
The above discussion shows that some aspects of the provisions 
concerning contributions operate to weaken the stability properties of 
the program. What about benefits? Benefits to the unemployed tend to 
support consu.mptie>a expenditures during relatively limited contraction• 
ary periods. The.limitation to the time period for which benefits may 
be received would render t.ke program ineffective in a severe depres• 
sic»n. ModificatiGas could be macile te strengthen this aspect of the 
system. Extended ceverage, lengthening of payment period, increase in 
size of payment 9 and shl!H'tening of the time period between loss of job 
and receipt of payment w~uld all increase the effectiveness of the pro-
gram as a cc1l!D.terQ~yclical device. 
Most of this chapter has dealt with the nature of the additions to 
and.subtractions from iacome made by the unemployment insurance program. 
The discussion Gf built-in stabilization touches upon the timing of the 
automatic device. In the following chapter, this aspect Gf the invest-
igation will be more thoroughly tr,ated. 
CHAPTER IV 
TIE TIMING OF THE AUTOMATIC J)EVICE 
The tim~n.g of the autQU.tic device is the subject of this chapter. 
As stated. earlier, timiag refers to the coincidence of additions made 
by the unemployment insw:-ance program with a falling income str,tw, 
and, conversely, the coincidence of subtractions with a risil\t. income 
stream. If the coincidence exists, the program acts as a built,•in 
stabilizer. To determine whether or not the program has been timed 
. . 
properly, a. 13=y~ar period.,·· 1946-1958, has been examined. Yearly~ 
q111arterly, and monthly operations of the program were separately con-
sidered. This chapter presents tne results of this empirical study. 
Yearly Operations 
The empirical study utilized five statist.ical seriea: (1) nation-
al inc011J1e; (2) c~imtributions; (j) benefit payments; (4) the excess of 
~oimtributions over benefits (sometimes referred to as "excess" in the 
. ' . ' I . 
following discussion); (5) acquisitions by the Une,i,loyment Trust Fund 
of gQVermne1111t obligatifl)aS (SO!Jletimes referred tc., as i•acquisitioils). 
Little fw:-ther need be said of the national income series since it con-
sists of figures ·published by the Department of Commerce. The other 
f~ur sets of data req~ire further comment. 
The benefit series represents payments made by states under their 
laws to UD.81'1,ployed perSO!hSo PaymeD.tf mad, durinJ the y,ears 1954-'1'958 
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under the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees Act are exclu-
ded. Although these payments are made by state agencies,.they are not 
a part of the state system and their inclusion would reader 1954-1958 
data incomparable with data for 1946-1953. Payments made in 1958 
under the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act are also excluded to 
avoid distorting the datum for that year. 
Contributions consist of contributions made by employers to state 
m11empleyment trust f~nds under state laws, and excise taxes paid to 
the federal gil!!Vernment by employers covered by the Federal Unemployment 
'l'ax Act. 
The series referred to as the excess represents the excess of COl\-
tributions over benefit payments. Since contributions usually exceeded 
benefits during the period under study, the net effect of the two is 
best represented by this set of data. In years when benefits exceed 
contributions, a minus sign is attached to the datum. 
The acquisitions series represents acquisitions of government 
obligations made by the Unemployment Trust Fund. In years in which net 
redemptions of securities occurred, a minus sign is attached to the 
datwn. 
Since we are interested only in cyclical fluctuations in the 
series, these movements must be isolated. This was done by construct-
iimg straight=liae trends for each set of data (using the least-~quares 
method) and measuring the variations of original data from the trend 
values. It was thought best in the case of national income to use a 
2l=year period, 1938=1958, for construction of the trend line. Trends 
for all other series were constructed using the shorter period under 
study, 1946-1958. 
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Percentage variations from trend values for .national income and 
benefit payments are plotted in Figure 2. The figure shows clearly 
that positive fluctuations in income coincide with negative fluctua• 
tions in benefits and vice versa. Computation of a Pearsonian statis-
tical correlation between the percentage variations from trend values 
for the two sets of data produces a coefficient of minus 80. Taus, 
f~ the period ~ader study, a high degree of correlation existed be0 
tween @pward cyclical variations in income and dC>Waward cyclical 
variations in benefits. Benefit payments exerted a counter-cyclical 
force in the economy during the period 1946•1958. 
In correlati'll'l\8 income and contributions, a one-quarter lag was 
recognized in the contributions series. This adjustment is necessi-
tated by a stip~lation in state laws allowing employers to tender their 
payments to state unemployment trust funds on a quarterly basis. Ov'er 
90 per cent of all cGntributions are actually collected by state agen• 
cies i~ the first two months of each quarter. For instance, amounts 
appearing in state clearing accounts in April and May represent liabil-
ities incurred d~ing the preceding January, February, and March. Fed0 
eral excise tax paymemts are made in January and February, based on 
prior calendar year payr~lls. Thus, the one 0 quarter lag will match 
these data with the proper income figures. 
Figw:'e 3 shows percentage deviations from trend values for income 
and contributioas. As can be seen, positive fluctuations in income and 
contributions coincide rather closely. The coefficient of correlation 
between the twc series of percentage variations is plus 65. Although 
the degree of correlation is not as high as was found with respect to 
b~nefits 9 it is high enough to conclude that contributions did, during 
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Figure-2. Cyclical variations in yearly national income and benefit 
payments,. (Computation of trend and cycle for national in.come util-
ized data frn 1959 issue of Business Statisti.cs. p'blished by the 
trnited States Gffiee of Business Econnics, page 1. Computations 
of trend and cycle for benefit pe,yments util:i,ied ,data from relevant 
issues o.f the Social Security Bulletin publisb.,t,d by the United 
States St>cial Security Administra,ion.) · 
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Figure 3. Cyclical variations in. yearly national income,and contri-
butiGns. (Computation of trend and cycle for national income util-
ized data frCMD 1959 issue of Business Statistics published by the 
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the peri@d u~der investigation 9 operate in a eounterQcyclical fashion. 
Cyclical fl~ct~atio~s in the series representing the excess of con-
trib~tions over benefits are plotted on Figure 4. Since the existence 
of negative values in the data precludes percentage computations, abso0 
lute d~llar variations are shown. Percentage variations in income 
pl~tted on Wig~res 2 and 3 are shown on Figure 4, beside the absolute 
deviations i~ the ex~ess series for corresponding years. It can be 
ieen th~t in every year ex~ept 1947 that income fluctuated above the 
trend line 9 the ex~ess did likewise, and in all years that income 
varied negatively, simUar variations occurred in the excess series. 
If it wer~ p~ssible t@ statistically correlate percentage variations 
i@ ine<Olme with percentage variations in the excess series, the result 
w~~ld be a p~sitive ~@efficient lying somewhere between 65 (the coeffm 
icient ass@~iated with incffl!le and contributions) and 80 (the coeffi-
@ient ass@ciated with in©<!lmlle and benefits). Thus» the combined effect 
@f ©@ntrib~tions and benefit@ during the period 1946-1958 was to exert 
a ©@~nter 0 cyclical infl~ence ~n the economy. 
Since fMncls n@t reqMired for benefit payments are invested in 
gow~rnm~nt $eCMrities 9 ©y©lieal variations in the acquisitions series 
are alm@st identi©al t~ the variations in the excess series (see Figure 
4). The economic effect @f the two variables on the economy may, how-
ever, be of different degre~s. It has bee~ asswned, realistically, 
that the effects of contributions and benefits are of the same degree, 
th@1l!lgh directly opp@site. That is, a doU.ar inJected into the economy 
thr@ugh benef ii!:$ ex~rts aim expansionary infhience equal to the contra.cm 
ti@~ary infl1l!lence of a d@llar extracted from the ec~nomy through con~ 
trillniticms. '!'h\\!\$ 9 it ii lL@gical to combine the two series to measure 
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Figure 4. Cyclicarl>-,,ariatiQnlin ihe excess and acquisiti0ns,series. 
(Computation of' the excess and acquisitions and trend and cycle 
values for both series utilized data from relevant issues of the , 
Social Security Bulletin published by the United States Social 
Security Administratien. · Percentage va:tiatiens from trend· values 
for natienal income were taken frOIII! Fig,re 3.) 
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their net effect. 
This measurement whicn has been referred to as the excess repre-
seats a net extraction frcma (or additioa to) income. Since over 90 
per cent of all trust fund accumulations during the period under study 
·\ 
were Treaslllry special issues, .the acquisitions series represEtats in 
effect funds available tc the Treasury for dispGSitan a): its discre• 
tien (or when iss~es are redeemed, Treasury cash. outlay). To ascer-
tai~ the economic effects of trust fund acquisitions (or Treasury 
redemptiGas) 9 it is necessary to determine the influence upon Treasury 
spending 9 taxing and borrewiag policies of trust fund operations. An 
extended investigation of this matter is beyond tae scope of this the-
sis. It has been assumed. tb.a.t these operations nave little, if any, 
influence on Treasury policies. 
Quarterly Operations 
As.ide from trust fund operations, it has been shown that the 
1ilm.empl«i!>yment insurance pregram does, on a yearly basis, act as a b'1ilt0 
in stabilizer in the natioimal economy. The possibility, however, of 
~btaining different res~lts when using time periods of less than a year 
ne<:essitates fm-ther investigation. Thus, the study now turns to 
q\llJ8.rterly operations. 
Three statistical series were used to test the quarterly effects 
Gf the program: (1) national incCl)Dle; (2) contributions; (3) benefit 
payments. The income and benefit series are those used in the examin• 
ation of yearly data, but placed on a quarterly basis. The yearly con-
tribution series, hC11we.ver, b.as been modified to exclude excise taxes 
paid t~ the federal govermnent. The employers' privilege of tendering 
their federal tax liabilities yearly precludes inclusion of this data 
in qln&rterly figWC'es. 
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'l'he existence ef negative values in both the excess and acquisi• 
tiGns series presents problems sufficiently involved to render imprac-
t_ical their use in any formal statistical tests in con,aectioa with time 
peril@ds of less than. om.e year. As will be presently shown, this diff i• 
e1llllty will serio~sly hamper neither tne st•dy's validity nor its result· 
illllg ccmicJl.1tJJsi~ll'!ls. 
The isolati~n of cyclical variations in quarterly data was com• 
,~~nded by the existence of seasonal influences in the benefits and 
c«:»mtri'f!l•1llltions series. These influences were, however, elimiaated by 
proper statistical met?aocls, and quarterly variations from respective 
trend val~es were obtained for each set of data. Since the Department 
~f Ccmimerce p~blishe1 1easiGmially adjusted qU1&rterly natioaal income 
fig•es, the is4l)lJ.ati~n ef the cyclical variations ia th.is series pre• 
semted nG partic~ll.ar problems. As in the case of yearly data, trend 
influences were eliminated in all.l three series by computation of 
straight=ll.ine trends (empll.~ying the least-squares method). For bene• 
fits aimd cointribti!ti@ms the period 1946 .. 1958 was usedt for income the 
period 1938=1948. 
Q1lllB.lrterly percentage variations from trend values for national 
income and benefit payments are plotted Gn Figure S. The coincidence 
of positive fl~ct111J£ti~s in income with negative variations in bene-
fits is obvious. The coefficient of correll!ltion between tnese two is 
a min~s 79, almost equal to the coefficient of minus 80 obtained using 
yearly data. Tlnus, qu.rterly operatii!i>ns gf benefits -exerted a counter• 
cyclical influence duriag the period 1946-1958 equal in degree to that 
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Figure S·.. Cyclical variations in quarterly national income and benefit payments.. (Computation ef trend 
and cycle-· for national income utilized data from relevant issues of Business Statistics published by 
the United States Office of Jusiness Economics. Computation_ of trend and ~ycle for benefit payments 
utilized data from relevant issues of t,e Social Security Bulletin.published by the United States 
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exerted by yearly operations. 
The same one-quarter lag was r~t0gnized in quarterly contributions 
as in the yearly series, and for the same reason. Figure 6 shows quar-
terly percentage variations in income and contributions. Note. however, 
tltat a coincidence of movements in the two series is not clear. Ia 
fact, the coefficient ef correlation associated with quarterly incGme 
and contributions is a low positive 44. This result is not promising 
as far as built-in stability is eencerned. It means that quarterly 
contributions were not, during the period under study, responeive 
enough to changes in inceme to warrant any conclusion concerning their 
counter-cyclical effect. 
As mentioned earlier, no attempt was made to statistically connect 
income to the excess and acquisitions series on a quarterly basis. 
However, a statistical correlation between inceme and the excess would 
produce a positive ceefficiemt lying somewhere between .44 (the coeff-
icient associated with contributions) and .79 (the coefficient asso• 
ciated with benefits). This coefficient would be closer to .44 than to 
.79 since contributions are larger than benefits; and it would not be 
as ~!gh as .62, the average cf these two figures, but would probably 
• 
net fall much below a positive .&o. Thus, the cembined effect of quar-
terly contributions and benefits, although not as responsive to income 
caanges as yearly data, did, during the period 1946-1958, exert con• 
siderable counter-cyclical influence. 
Monthly Operations 
Testing the timing of mont~ly operations presented several diffi-
culties. Due to the method by which contributions are collected, 
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explained above, it is impHsible to censtruct a meaningful contribu• 
tions series on a ~Gnthly basis. This, of course, also eliminates the 
excess series. Since monthly national income figures are not pub-
lished, the best measure of economic activity is also unavailable on a 
montllly basis. 
All is not lost, however. The Department of Commerce provides a 
monthly series for personal income, and tais was adopted as a suffi-
ciently accurate measm:-e ~f economic activity. Statistical procedures 
mentioned above were empl~yed to isolate cy•lical movements in the 
monthly personal income series as well as in a monthly benefit series. 
A correlation between cyclical variations ia these two series produced 
a coefficient of a minus 63. Monthly benefit payments, therefore, were 
found to be fairly responsive to movements ia personal income. It is 
felt that a higher association would be discovered between monthly ban• 
efits and national inceme if the latter data were available. This 
conclusion is based ea tke fact that, on a yearly basis, cyclical var-
iations in benefits were more closely associated with such variations 
in national income than similar movements in personal income. The 
coefficient of correlaticm. between yearly personal income and benefits 
was a minus .75 during the period under study. As was shown earlier, 
yearly nation.al inceme was associated with benefits during the same 
period by a coefficient of minus .80. 
No further statistical tests can be performed on monthly data. It 
is fairly evident that monthly contributions are even less counter-
cyclical than quarterly,.data. Accordingly, a monthly excess series 
would be inadequately timed to produce noteworthy results. Except for 
benefits, the operations of the program did not significantly stabilize 
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monthly incGme in the economy during the period 1946 .. 1958. 
Conclusions 
Tb.e results of the empirical study caa be summarized: 
(1) Yearly benefit payments and contributicm.s during the period 
1946•1958 were timed in such a way as to mitigate yearly fluctuations 
in national income. 
(2) Quarterly be~efit payments did, during the period under study, 
ceiacide closely with changes in quarterly income, but the coincidence 
of q/tnarterly contributi&1H with variations in income was not close. 
The combined eperations of benefits and centributions did, however, act 
' in a stabilizing fashio~. 
(3) Changes in monthly contributions probably did not vary with 
changes in monthly inc@llme during the period under study. Monthly. hen• 
efits were, however, timed properly. 
(4) Trust ft111md operations may limit the counter-cyclical effects 
of other aspects cf the program. This would be true if either ~he 
second or third assmiptiioi;n discussed on pages 44 .. 46 is:~cortect. 
The analysis ~f the size, nature, and timing of the automatic 
device is completed. The f~llcwiug chapter presents a final summary 
of the study and makes explicit some conclusions. 
CHAPTER·V 
SUMMARY.AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is now appropriate to present an overall sunuury of the entire 
study. The first ch.apter introduces the subject, presents some.back-
ground material, and defines the purpese a1'ci scope of the thesis. Tae 
purpose is to determine whetb.er.or not the.United States federal-state 
unemployment insurance system acts as a built•ia autGmatic·stabilizer I . . . . 
of economic activity. 
In prCi>Vicling a background, it is peiatecl out in Ch.apter I. taat 
autGmatic forces, ~otb. "normal'' and ''built . in!,'~' and nea-autematic 
forces largely determine tb.e .level of activity ia any ecdaomy. · The 
disagreement between "Classical" and "Keyneeianu economists concerning 
the ability of the '1nermal" autQmatic .forces to preduce full employment 
is reviewed. One leading mede:rn economist, Pa•l Samuelso:n, maintains 
that full employment will be insured in tae United States only if the 
built-in and normal forces are supplemente~ by the non-automatic forces 
of m!l)aetary and fiscal policy. Another eminent writer. Arthur Burns, 
feels that recent structural changes have created tae necessary auto .. 
maticity for a relatively full-employment eCODQR\Y• 
Both. writers recegaize tb.e existence of certai:n automatic stabi• 
lizers which nave been built in to the ecnomy,ancl give some of the 
credit to these forces for the pest-World War II and predicted future 
prosperity of the United States. 
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Thus, the initial chapter emphasizes the significance of ascertain-
ing whether or not one of these so-called automatic stabilizers-- the 
United States unemployment insurance syste°"•- does, in reality, possess· 
counter-cyclical qualities. 
Following the background material, the plan of the study is pre• 
sented. The unemployment insurance program is, .in this thesis, viewed 
as an automatic counter-cyclical device the operations of which dimi• 
nish economic activity or income when the.latter ·is.rising and augment 
income when it is falling. The device is analyzed in terms of its size, 
nature, and timing •. 
The United States unemployment insurance program provides finan-
cial assistance called benefit payments to eUgible unemployed persons. 
These payments are financed by a payroll tax on covered employers. The 
tax is also referred to as contributions to unC!mployment insurance 
trust funds. The size of. the automatic device, analyzed in Chapter II, 
involves an examination of th.e federal and state laws and the operations 
of the laws which determine the magnitude of benefit·payments and con-
tributions. 
After a brief examination of relevant federal and state provi-
sions and changes in these provisions, it is pointed out that the· 
volume of both benefit payments and.contributions.increased constantly 
during the period 1938-1958 •. 
The relative size of the program is shown by comparing on anann-
ual basis the difference between contributions and benefit payments 
with national income. It is pointed out in Chapter II that this dif-
ference has not been as much as one per cent of national income in 
any year since the inception of the program& In this sens~, the 
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program is rather insignificant. However, when changes in the excess 
of contributions over benefit payments are cGJDpared with changes in 
income, a more accurate view of the program is obtained. In the con-
tractionary years of 1945, 1949, 1954, and 1958, changes in this 
excess, representing the net effect of contributions and benefit pay-
ments on the economy, were quite significant in relation to changes in 
national income. 
The nature of the automatic device, involving an analysis of the 
economics of unemployment insurance, is examined in Chapter III. Since 
contributions are, in effect, payroll taxes levied on covered employ-
ers, an attempt is made to locate the incidence of these taxes. The 
program's impact upon the economy may depend on which group bears its 
financial burden. A review of the literature reveals that, prior to 
1935, writers place the incidence of the tax with the worker. The ten-
dency among more recent economists, however, is to maintain that consu-
mers help bear the burden through higher prices. At any rate, the 
analysis indicates that the economic effect of contributions, per se, 
will be contractionary. 
Benefit payments, it is held in Chapter III, exert an expansion-
ary effect upon the economy by shifting the aggregate demand for goods 
and services to the right. This effect will be slightly limited to 
the extent that the payments adversely affect worker incentive and/or 
mobility. 
The net long-run combined effect of benefit payments and contri-
butions, assuming the two are of equal volume, will probably produce 
higher prices, leaving the wage rate, production and employment vir-
tually unaffected. This conclusion assumes, of course, a money 
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supply elastic enough to absorb the increase in the price level. When 
contributions and benefit payments are unequal, the net impact of the 
two is either contractionary or expansionary, depending on which is the 
greater. 
It is maintained, hewever, in Chapter III, that the net effect of 
the entire program cannot be ascertained witheut considering the OJ>er""' 
ations of the Unemployment Trust Fund. Acquisitions by this Fund of 
United States obligations, using contributions not needed for benefit 
payments, and redemptiens, when benefits exceed contributions, of 
securities previously acquired, could partially offset the impact of 
other aspects of the program. A completely offsetting effect was, how• 
ever, not assumed in this study. 
Also in Chapter III the United States unemployment insurance sys-
tem was compared with the theory of built-in stabilization. The device 
was found te fit the theory rather closely in most respects. Some 
aspects of the pr0gram such as experience-rating arrangements do limit 
its counter 0 cyclical qualities. Trust fund operations may, as mention-
ed above, further reduce its theoretical qualifications as an automatic 
stabilizer. 
Chapter IV presents an empirical investigation of the timing of 
the automatic device. Ignoring trust fund operations, the device is 
timed properly if injections into the income stream in the form of 
benefit payments coincide with a falling income, and if subtractions 
from income in the form of contributions coincide with a rising income 
stream. Cyclical variations in national income were correlated with 
cyclical variations in contributions and benefits to ascertain the 
existence and extent of this coincidence. 
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Yearly, quarterly, aad monthly operations of the program duriD.$ 
the period 1946-1958 were considered. Both y.early c0ntributions and 
benefit payments wer.e, during the period, timed pro~erly. Quart,rly. 
and monthly benefits also acted in a counter•cyclic!l fashion. No sig• 
nificaat correlation, however, was found between national incClNU ••d 
contributions on either a quarterly or monthly ·basis. 
,: 
The results of thi-s attempt to ascertain. wketber or D;Qt the' Uni-
,. 
Ii·· 
ted States unemployment insurance system dees, in reality, p9ssess 
: . ' l' 
counter-cyclical qualities can be briefly stated. Exc.pt·f,s limited 
by trust fund operatieas, y~arly operations of the prograt1·exerta 
stabilizing influence on economic activity as aeasured by ,atio~l 
income. Likewise, quarterly and monthly benefit payments perfor~ a 
stabilizing function. During periods of less than a year, contr~bu-
tions do not mitigate variations in economic activity. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
, 
Altman, Ralph. Availabilitv For Work .. Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1950. 
Bauder, Russel. ttTh.e Probable Incidence of Social Security Taxes," 
American Economic Review, XXXVI (September, 1936), 463-465. 
Becker, Joseph M. Tae Problem of Abuse~ Unemployment Benefits. 
New York: Columbia UniversU:y Press, 1953. 
1,Burns, Artb.ur F. "Progress Toward Economic Stability," American 
Economic Review; L, part l, (March, 1960), 1°30. (Paper read 
at the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association). · 
t,<Burns, Eveline Mo S0cial Security and Public Policy. New York: 
McGraw=lill, 19560 
---· 
toward S.ocial Security. New Yorio Whittlesey House, 1,;36. 
Clague, Ewan. "The lconaie Aspects of an Integrated Social Security 
Program, ft American Econc»mic Rev:iew~ XXXVI (March, 1936), 122-125. 
(Round Table: Discussion at the Forty"'.Ji'ifth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association). · 
Cohen, Wilbur (co-ed.) 
tice Hall, 1948. 
I 
1'a.;.iii:pss !!. Social Security. 
•. 
New York: :. Pren-
Gagliardo, Domenica. American Social Insurance. New York: Harper 
and Brothers. 1955. 
Baber 9 William (eo0 ed.) Readings in Social Security. New York: 
Prcmtice-Ha:U, 1948. 
Harris, Seym~ur E. Economies of Social Security. New York: Mc-Graw 
Hill, 1941. 
Musgrave I) Ro A., and others. ''Distribution of Tax Paymants by In.come 
Groups: A Case Study for 1948," National Tax Journal, IV (Marca, 
1951), 1-53. . 
Patin.kin» Don. "Price Flexibility and Full Employment," Readings in 
Monetary Theory. New York: Irwin, 1951, 250-286. 
73 
U. S .. 9 Bureau of Employment Security. Comparison of State Unemployment 
Insurance ~ !.! of August, !!54. Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1954. 
Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance~!.! of January 
!, 1958. Washington.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1958. 
1,/ 
___ • Empl0yment and Wages 0£ Workers Covered ]?I. State Unempleyment 
Insurance M!.!!!• Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office .. 
___ .. E!llllPloymellht §!_curU:y Review. Washington: United States Gov-
ernment Printing Office. 
u. s., Bureau of l&ber Statistics. Employment an~.Earnings. Wash.ing-
ton: United States Gwermnent Printing Office. 
u. So 9 Office of Business Economics. Business Statistics. Was~ington: 
United States Government Printing ·Office. 
u. So P Social Security Administration. Sacial Security Bulletin. 
Washington: United States Govermnent Printing Office. 
U. S., Statutes !:!, Large 9 XLIX, LII, LIII, LVI, LX, I.XII, LXX. 
l/Samuelson, Pa\lll Ao Ee~imomics, Ari Introductory ~nalysis. New York: 
Mc!i.Graw=HUl 9 19580 
SU.enter 9 Sumner H. "Tb.e Impact of S9cial Security Legislation Upon 
Mobility and Enterpris11 9 '' American Ec@nomi\C Review{ XL (March, 
1940 supplement) 9 44=60. 
Stewart, Ml!LxweU S. Social Security. New York.: w. W. Norton ~nq. 
Company 9 193 7 o 
VITA 
James Albert Cacy 
CalThdidate for the Degree of 
Master of Science 
Thesis: Tl!IE COUNTER$CYCLICAL EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Major Field: Economics 
Biographical: 
~ersonal Data: Bgrn near Bristow, OklahC)ma, February 28, 1933, 
the. soin ®Jf Killl\g W. 9 Sr., and S~rah A. Cacy. 
Educatiol!u Attended grade sci.hool in the Oklahoma country schools 
ef Dunham anu Sunrise 9 and in Kellyville, Oklahoma; gradua~ 
ted from Sapulpa High School, Sapulpa, Oklahoma, in 1950; 
r~ceived the Bachel(l)r of Seienc~ degree fr~m the Oklahoma 
State ~nive~$ity in May, 1959, with a major in Accouating; 
m.mclle app°!ico11ti1®im f@r a Master O!f Science degree, with a major 
in l!fo<illn®Jmfos, fr@m the Oklahoma State University, to be 
received Aug~it 6, 1960. 
Professional experience: Served as a graduate assistant in the 
Departmemt ~f Ec~n(mlics while w~rking toward the Master's 
Degt:ee ,.at Okla!tui>ma State University; dwities &s a ,graduate 
assistant includ~ research f~r the Busine$S Extension Service. 
